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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In the Green case the Court said that if the waiver extends to the
whole offense for which the defendant was indicted, then he is faced with
a dilemma.23  In order to gain a chance to have corrected what he con-
siders an erroneous conviction of a lesser offense, he must run the risk
of conviction of an offense which may be punishable by death. This
gives him no meaningful choice. Accordingly, those decisions which are
in line with the Green case limit the extent of the waiver to the offense
of which he was convicted. He is deemed acquitted of any greater
offense by the first verdict.24
From the foregoing it is seen that there are two opposing camps
regarding the question presented by the Green case. The two are ap-
proximately equal in number and can possibly be equally well supported
by logical argument. The danger is that well reasoned logic may obscure
the point in conflict. Perhaps the answer to this problem is more a
matter of policy than of logic. Justice Holmes said that "in this country
there is more danger that criminals will escape justice than that they will
be subjected to tyranny."25 Yet, in the orderly administration of justice
that balance is likely as equal as laws can devise. It is therefore sub-
mitted that the holding of the Green case exemplifies the spirit, if not
clearly the letter, of the prohibition against double jeopardy.2
R.ICHARD C. CARMICHAEL, JR.
Criminal Law-Obstructing Justice-Interfering With a Police Officer
Statutes imposing criminal sanctions for obstructing justice' coritain
such descriptive words as obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, interfere,
hinder, prevent, intimidate and impede. The question raised is should
of the cause." Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904). No cases in
support of this theory have been found.
233 55 U.S. at 193.2
'Hearn v. State, 212 Ark. 360, 205 S.W.2d 477 (1947); Commonwealth v.
Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 AtI. 275 (1908).
" Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
"The holding of the Green case will affect only the federal courts, as the
double jeopardy prohibition contained in the fifth amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not apply to the states. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319(1937). However, an interesting sidelight of the Green case is the fact that the
majority opinion was written by Justice Black, who has insisted that the four-
teenth amendment due process clause incorporates the entire Bill of Rights so as
to make its provisions binding on the states. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion). The majority of the Court has always refused
to accept this idea. For a discussion of the majority view, see Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinions in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412 (1945),
and Adamson v. California, supra at 59.
'ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 402 (1940); Aliz. REv. STAT. ANt. § 13-541 (1956);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1005 (Burns 1956); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 135, § 21(1954); MiNir. STAT. ANN. § 613.56 (1947); Nan. REv. STAT. § 28-729 (1948);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (1953); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:99-1 (1953); TENN.
CoDE ANN. § 39-3104 (1955) ; W. VA. CODE; ANN. § 6015 (1955).
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these words be interpreted as including conduct which did not involve
the use of force or threats to use force and which could not have incited
a riot.
In Andersen v. United States2 a police officer was issuing a double
parking ticket to another party when Andersen, a bystander, protested
the officer's authority to issue the ticket. The officer, in arresting Ander-
sen for being disorderly, tore Andersen's shirt. Andersen in turn
pushed the officer but then submitted to the arrest. Andersen admitted
in the trial court that he protested the officer's right to issue the parking
ticket but denied being disorderly or interfering with the officer. For
the act of pushing the officer, Andersen was convicted of assault.8 He
appealed on the ground that he had not committed the misdemeanor of
interfering with or obstructing justice and for that reason he was justified
in using reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest. Although there
was no indication in the report that Andersen was indicted for inter-
fering with a police officer, the court said it appeared from the de-
fendant's admissions in the trial for assault that he had committed the
misdemeanor of interfering with a police officer 4 as a matter of law;
therefore, his arrest was lawful and his resistance unjustified.
Should an orderly protest to a police officer be an obstruction of
justice? An annotation 5 and the treatises6 take the position that remon-
strating with an officer on behalf of another or questioning an officer
while he is performing his duty does not constitute an obstruction,
hindrance or interference.
From a general search of the annotated state statutes on obstructing
justice, no other case was found where a court had interpreted its statute
so liberally. On the contrary citizens were found not guilty of obstruct-
ing justice where they merely questioned, commented to, or remonstrated
with police officers concerning arrests.
In People v. Magnes7 the defendant asked why certain persons were
placed in custody. A lower New York court found that the inquiries
propounded in a gentlemanly manner did not amount to an interference
2 132 A.2d 155 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955).
' D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504 (1951): "Assault or threatened assault in a inen-
acing manner. Whoever unlawfully assaults or threatens another in a menacing
manner, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or be imprisoned not
more than twelve months or both."
'D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-505(a) (Supp. VI 1958): "Assault on a inember of
police force. (a) Whoever without justifiable and excusable cause, assaults,
resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any officer or member of
any police force operating in the District of Columbia while engaged in or on
account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both."
Annot., 48 A.L.R. 753 (1927).
'39 Am. Jum., Obstructing Justice § 10 (1942) ; 67 C.J.S., Obstructing
Justice § 2 (1950). See also 6 ARK. L. REv. 46 (1951).
'187 N.Y. Supp. 913 (N.Y. County Ct. Gen. Sess. 1921).
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with a police officer. The court went on to say that the defendant had
a perfect right to make the inquiries of a police officer. In Chicago v.
Brod8 the defendant at the scene of another's arrest commented, "Well,
he [referring to the arresting officer who had his gun in hand] doesn't
have to shoot him."9  The court, reversing the conviction for inter-
fering with justice, asked: "If this pronouncement of the trial judge is
sustainable, where are our boasted liberties? Must the citizen be be-
holden to the whim and humor of the police for his freedom ... ?"10 In
District of Columbia v. Little" the defendant refused to unlock the door
of her home for a health officer and remonstrated on constitutional
grounds. The defendant's actions were held not to be an interference.
The court said that although force or theatened force is not always an
indispensable ingredient of the offense of interfering with an officer in
the discharge of his duties, mere remonstrances or even criticisms of an
officer are not usually held to be the equivalent of unlawful interference.
In People v. Pilkington,12 while the police officer was putting prisoners
into the patrol car, the defendant advised the prisoners to keep their
mouths shut and a lawyer would soon be on the way. The court held
this not to be a violation of the city ordinance which states that it is
unlawful to harm, obstruct, or resist any officer in the performance of
his duties.
Under the court's interpretation in the principal case, a police officer
cannot be questioned by an innocent bystander. The statute 3 so inter-
preted makes orderly protests to a police officer punishable as a matter of
law by $5,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both.
NICK J. MILLER
Domestic Relations-Custody-Contests Between Parent and
Nonparent
Probably one of the most important and yet most unsettled areas of
the law today is that of custody of children, particularly in a contest
between a parent and nonparent. As early as 18761 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred when he was of the
opinion that in law the mother had a primary right (as against the
1141 Ill. App. 500 (1908).
9Id. at 501. 'ld. at 502.
11339 U.S. 1 (1950). Although not squarely in point, this case was included
because it arose in the same jurisdiction. Also, it should be pointed out that in
1953 D.C. CODE § 22-505(a) (1951) was amended; the phrase, "personal violence
upon an officer," was deleted, and the phrase, "assaults, resists, opposes, impedes,
intimidates or interferes with any officer," was inserted. D.C. CoDE § 22-505(a)
(Supp. VI 1958).
2 199 Misc. 665, 103 N.Y.S.2d 64 (County Ct. 1951).
1 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-505 (Supp. V 1956).
'Spears v. Snell, 74 N.C. 210 (1876).
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